In
1935,
following the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, I was transferred to
the Western Desert to command a squadron of light cars. It was feared that
the Italians, who were massing troops in Libya, might be tempted
to invade Egypt if they were frustrated in Ethiopia. My squadron's
task was to patrol the border south of Salluwm. We operated in liaison
with other Egyptian and British forces, among which were units of the
Ist Essex Regiment and the 5th Northumberland Fusiliers. Both
were then based at Marsa Matruwh.
In
1936,
after the Italians had conquered Ethiopia and had consequently ceased
to threaten Egypt, I was reassigned to Cairo to serve as
a deputy adjutant general under Brigadier Hasan `Abd al-Wahhab.
The year 1936 was one of the most eventful in the history of modem
Egypt.
King
Fuw'ad died in April and was succeeded by Faruwq
in May. In August, Egypt and Great Britain signed
a twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance.
The
Treaty
of 1936 (see the Hawashiy below), as it came to be known, terminated
the British occupation of all but a small portion of Egypt the Suez
Canal Zone, where a maximum of 10,000 soldiers, including 400
fliers, were to be based for the treaty's duration. The treaty also
abolished the legal immunities and special privileges enjoyed by Britons
and other foreigners in Egypt and the discriminatory restrictions
to which Egyptians had been subjected in Sudan. It reduced the status
of the British High Commissioner to that of an ambassador and established
a British military mission to train and equip the Egyptian Army to the
extent necessary to ensure the defense of Egypt without further
assistance from the British Army except
"in the event of war, imminent
menace of war or apprehended international emergency."
In
such an event the King of Egypt was obliged to make available
to the King and Emperor of Great Britain " all the facilities
and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes
and means of communication, and to take all the administrative and legislative
measures, including the establishment of martial law and an effective censorship,
necessary to render these facilities and assistance effective It was hardly
an ideal treaty from the Egyptian point of view inasmuch as it authorized
a limited British occupation for another twenty years. But the new
relationship established between the two countries was so much less inequitable
than any previous Anglo-Egyptian relationship that the treaty was received
in Cairo with rejoicing. Before long, however, the British attempted
to re-occupy western Egypt on the pretext that another war was imminent.
When
they requested permission to carry out maneuvers in the Western Desert
south of Fayuwm, I recommended that such permission be refused
on the ground that it would constitute a violation of the treaty. The then
Chief of Operations, Brigadier Ahmad Hamdiy Himmat
agreed with me and refused to allow the maneuvers. I was not insensible
to the growing danger of war, but neither was I insensible to the desire
of the British to reoccupy Egypt at their first opportunity. Now
that their forces had at last been confined to the Canal Zone, I
was not eager to see them emerge from their confinement except in the event
of an "imminent menace of war."
I also
put a stop to the British habit of communicating with us through their
military mission. I insisted that all communications be addressed to the
Egyptian Army directly. I put a stop, too, to the custom of issuing Egyptian
military orders in both English and Arabic. I had no objection to providing
the British with Arabic copies of our orders, but I insisted that it was
no part of our obligations under the treaty to provide them with a free
translation service.
In
1937,
in addition to my other duties, I founded "The Magazine of the Egyptian
Army", which I edited for several years and to which I contributed
many articles. One of my favorite themes was the need for providing Egyptian
high school and college students with military training. It is still my
belief that military training for both sexes is essential to good citizenship
in a rapidly developing but still backward, impoverished, and largely illiterate
country. The Young Men's Muslim, Christian Associations,
their feminine auxiliaries, the Boy Scouts, the Girl Guides,
the Daughters of the Nile, and other private organizations have
all done excellent work, but for obvious reasons they have been able to
influence only a small percentage of the young people of Egypt.
The Army is the only institution capable of reaching the younger generation
as a whole, without distinction as to race, class, creed, or sex, and of
inculcating the pride, discipline, and spirit of self-sacrifice necessary
to overcome our tremendous social, economic, and political problems within
a reasonable length of time. The purpose of the military, as I have said,
is to defend a government from its enemies, foreign and domestic. One of
the best ways of doing so, as Turkey, Mexico, and certain other renascent
countries have demonstrated, is to so strengthen a country's social, economic,
and political fabric with the help of enlightened military training that
its enemies, foreign or domestic, will not be tempted to resort to armed
intervention.
In
1938
the British requested permission to send two battalions to
Marsa
Matruwh in order to "acquaint them with the
terrain." Out of curiosity, I asked them which two battalions they
intended to send. When they replied that they intended to send the same
two battalions from the Ist Essex Regiment and the 5th Northumberland
Fusiliers that had been stationed at Marsa Matruwh
in 1935, I advised `Abd al-Wahhab, the Adjutant General,
to refuse their request on the ground that these two battalions were already
as well acquainted with the terrain as they had any legitimate need to
be.
I
was
afraid that the British were merely seeking once again to establish a precedent
for violating the Treaty of 1936, according to which no members
of the British Armed Forces other than small parties of officers in civilian
dress on topographical and planning missions were to be stationed west
of the Nile in the absence of "war or an imminent menace of war."`Abd
al- Wahhab sent me to Lieutenant General `Aliy Fahmiy
the Minister of War, who was just about to countersign a letter
of approval. After hearing my arguments, he destroyed the letter and dictated
a new one, politely but firmly refusing the British request.
Not
long afterward I was named to accompany an Egyptian military mission to
England,
but at the last minute I was refused a visa. My name, it developed, had
been placed on the blacklist of the British military mission in Cairo.
Later, when I applied for admittance to the Staff Officers' School,
which was still run by the British, my application was rejected. I was
finally admitted in the autumn of 1938, however, at the personal
insistence of Hasan Sabriy, the civilian who had succeeded
`Aliy
Fahmiy as the Minister of War, and in 1939, I was permitted
to visit England with the other members of my class.
(To be continued)
"National
elections once again brought a Wafd majority to power with al-Nahhas
as premier, but the parties got together in a United Front to send a delegation
to England to negotiate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty in 1936.
Earlier attempts at treaties had failed for a variety of reasons, but by
then Egyptian politicians were willing to make concessions they had turned
down earlier because they feared a world war. The Italian presence in both
Ethiopia and Cyrenaica did little to assuage fears on the part
of both Egyptians and Britons. The outcome was a treaty that gave Egypt
little more than the terms it had been offered a decade earlier, but which
was hailed by most parties as a successful outcome to an impasse.
Individual
politicians objected to some of the clauses of the treaty. For example,
some feared the implications of a treaty which required the Egyptian
government to render Britain assistance in the event of war or "an
apprehended international emergency".
Some objected to the stipulation
that the Egyptian government undertake to build roads to facilitate British
troop movements within the country in the case of an emergency. By
and large most of the politicians felt that the treaty offered Egypt
substantial gains. It ended the occupation in a legal sense although not
in a physical one, for British troops were still to be stationed in the
Canal
Zone. It gave Egypt British support to get the country admitted
into the League of Nations as an independent country; it placed the responsibility
for protection foreigners and minorities with the Egyptian authorities
- the only one of the Four Reserved Points to be settled.
It promised
to assist Egypt in abolishing the capitulations
[1]
which
continued to plague any government and which finally came to an end in
1948.
The
treaty was to last for twenty years, when it would be reopened for negotiation,
and if no agreement was reached between both parties it would be
submitted to the Council of the League of Nations. Ambassadors were
exchanged, but the British Ambassador in Egypt was always to occupy
the position of senior ambassador. While the terms of the treaty
mentioned a joint protection of the Suez Canal by British and Egyptian
forces, no Egyptian forces or civilians were allowed to enter
the Canal British force and no Egyptian planes were allowed to fly over
the Canal Zone. The Egyptian army was to be trained and armed by British
officers and weapons and all British officials employed in the Egyptian
government were, eventually to be phased out and replaced by Egyptian officials.
The
terms of the treaty were described by al-Nahhas, who had
led the delegation, in the usual hyperbole as terms of ''honor and independence".'
Many thought quite differently and pointed out with justice that these
same terms had been offered in the past and turned down by the Wafd
as insufficient, because the Wafd had not then been party to the negotiations.
In parliament the treaty was discussed before ratification and both
Sidqqiy and
Muhammad Mahmuwd, the leaders of the
Liberal
Constitutional Party, who had been members of the delegation, pointed
out that the terms of the treaty did not give Egypt complete independence,
but they also pointed to the fact that the Egyptian army was in no condition
to undertake the defense of Egypt for some time to come and the
country would therefore have to rely on British protection.
The
general feeling was one of limited satisfaction that the treaty at least
had changed the previous deadlock and would open the door to future negotiations,
once fear of a world war had evaporated. The British army presence was
to be unobtrusive, for troops would be relegated to the Canal Zone,
instead of being stationed in the capital city, but they were still very
much there, as events in 1942 and 1951 were to demonstrate.
The
section of the community which was the most dissatisfied with the treaty
was that of the foreign residents. Many of them were of Greek, Levantine,
Armenian and Italian origin and had long been established in Egypt and
knew no other homeland, but preferred to keep their alien status and benefit
from the capitulations. The occupation had allowed them preferential rights
and the capitulations permitted them to make money but pay little in the
way of taxes. Now they were threatened with being treated on a par with
nationals. They would have to use native courts in cases of litigation
and not rely on the mixed courts, where a majority of the judges were aliens,
or on the consular courts in criminal cases. Some opted for Egyptian nationality,
some opted to leave, while others opted to remain aliens and to stay, but
at the same time transferring large amounts of money out of Egypt.
There
were some slight financial gains for some Egyptians through the treaty,
for while the population generally had to shoulder the heavy burden of
building roads and barracks for the British army, the Egyptian government
was allowed to appoint two members to the board of directors of the Suez
Canal Company. The company raised its annual payment to Egypt by £300,000
and agreed to hire 35 per cent of its workforce from among the Egyptian
population.
As
a byproduct of the treaty of alliance, the military academy opened its
doors wider to take in the sons of the middle and lower bourgeoisie, for
the army needed an officer corps. 10 per cent of the students were allowed
into the academy free of charge.The
most famous officer to come from that poorer milieu was Gamal
`Abd al-Nasir or Nasser as he came to be known
in the West.
Once
the treaty was negotiated, the Egyptian government could no longer use
it as an excuse to shelve internal problems and was forced to face these
with little knowledge of their ramifications or of their solutions. Institutions
were weak at best and the personal element tended to rule the institutional.
Intermediaries and patrons were appealed to and acted on behalf of their
clients, so that the institution was sidestepped in favor of the use, or
abuse, of influence. And yet people in government positions had a high
degree of moral rectitude and tried to act according to a notion of justice
and fair play; those who were accused of corruption were well-known figures
who were despised by the rest of the bureaucracy. Bribery was rare, although
a handful of powerful individuals were notorious for accepting bribes.
The government had no clear plan of how to reform the problems that faced
them and soon got bogged down in party infighting that conveniently put
off any major overhaul of the administration.
When
the second World War broke out, Egypt was faced with an invasion
from the western desert, where the Italian armies under Graziani
were eventually defeated by Wavell, who drove the Italians out of Cyrenaica
in March 1941. By the following month the British army was pushed
back by Rommel's advance and it looked as though Egypt would soon be occupied
by the Germans. For the next year, until November when the Battle of
al-`Alamayn finally forced Rommel's retreat from Egypt,
it seemed touch and go; by July 1942 German forces were within seventy
miles of Alexandria. The British embassy burned its files, in
preparation for an evacuation, and the Royal Air Force airport (Almazah)
in Heliopolis was bombed every night. Food became scarce. Prices
rose and some people took to hoarding. Ration cards were printed but they
were ineffective. The poor suffered hunger and rioted, blaming the British
army for their misery, and accusing them of eating the country's food.
Dissatisfaction
with the terms of the treaty surfaced. It had become obvious that Egypt
to spend a good deal of money and effort to provide facilities and amenities
for the British army, which was rapidly growing in numbers as a consequence
of the war. Furthermore , facilities for rest and recreation were also
being provided by an entrepreneurial class which made money from war profiteering,
military contracts, nightclubs and bars. The sight of so many uniformed
streets of the main cities in search of amusement shocked the sensibilities
of a population that was largely traditional, deeply religious, and which
frowned on the bars and houses of prostitution that mushroomed. This feeling
was especially high among the members of the 'Ikhwan,
the Society for Muslim Brethren, who were outraged that the poorer women
were opting for a life of sin through the lure of British gold. Their activities
multiplied as they showed their followers that Muslim principles and ethics
were infringed by the British presence. Few among the population cared
about the issues for which a world war was being fought, or were even familiar
with them."
`Afaf
Lutfiy A-Sayyid Marsot, A short
History of Modern Egypt.
p. 70-71, 98-100, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge 1985)
At present, Prof.
Emiretus `Afaf Marsot is fully retired and is writing historical
novels set in the Middle East.
Field of interest:
Near Eastern History: Modern period.
Education: D.
Phil. Oxford University, 1963
Publications:
Egypt & Cromer
(1968)
Egypt's Liberal
Experiment: 1922-1936 (1978)
Editor, Society
and the Sexes in Medieval Islam (1979)
Egypt in the
Reign of Muhammad Ali (1983)
A Short History
of Modern Egypt (1984). Second edition, 1994
Women and Men
in 18th Century Egypt (1995)
(1) "The
capitulations were grants of extraterritoriality given by Ottoman sultans
from the sixteenth century to various European Powers, along with the right
to trade in Ottoman territories. The grants allowed Europeans to station
in the Ottoman empire consuls who would try any of their citizens who resided
in the area for the infringement of their own national law. (According
to Ottoman custom, Ottoman Muslim law was applicable only to Muslims; religious
minorities were tried by their own church hierarchy.) As the Ottoman empire
weakened and became unable to defend itself against European military and
economic encroachments, the capitulations were abused by the Europeans,
who used them as a means of avoiding both taxation and the law. With the
complicity of their consuls, Europeans in the empire could commit any crime
with impunity. Their punishment was to be shipped out, but they could return
on the next ship and the local authorities could do nothing about it. Smuggling
therefore flourished, alien residents paid no taxes, even though they controlled
most of the sources of wealth, and the burden of taxation therefore fell
on the hapless fallah. Moneylenders did a thriving trade by lending
the fallah money at usurious rates, which rose as high as 20 per
cent a month, and when the fallah could not pay the interest on
the debt his land was seized for non-payment. Along with the national debt,
the indebtedness of the fallahiyn was another calamity to befall
the country."
|
